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Environmental Impediments to Bankruptcy
Reorganizations
JAm~s K. McBAiN*
[I]t is not a question of which statute should be accorded primacy over
the other, but rather what interaction between [the Bankruptcy Code
and CERCLA] serves most faithfully the policy objectives embodied in
the two separate enactments of Congress.'
INTRODUCTION
Only a decade ago, Congress resolved to combat those businesses which
threaten the public health and safety with hazardous wastes, by forcing
them to pay the costs of massive cleanups. Congress enacted the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA)2 and established the Superfund 3 to begin the task of environ-
mental reclamation and cost recovery 4 With the costs of reclamation runmng
extremely high, many corporations are now seeking to avoid the burdens
of cleanup by using bankruptcy as a shield from mounting environmental
obligations.5
The application of the Bankruptcy Code (Code)6 to CERCLA obligations
raises sharp policy conflicts between these powerful federal statutes. The
* LL.M. (Taxation) Candidate, 1993, Georgetown Umversity Law Center; J.D., 1992,
Indiana Umversity School of Law at Bloomington; A.B., 1990, University of Michigan. I wish
to thank Bruce Markel], Professor of Law at Indiana Umversity, for all of his thoughts and
helpful comments.
1. In re National Gypsum Co., 139 B.R. 397, 404 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1992).
2. CERCLA §§ 101-104, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. 1990).
3. CERCLA empowers the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) with funding and
enforcement authority for hazardous waste sites. The EPA may either use funds from the
Superfund, the trust funded by a tax on chemical and petroleum manufacturers and other
corporate polluters, toward cleanup, or subsequently assess such costs against potentially
responsible parties (PRPs). Id. If the site creates an "imminent and substantial endangerment
to the public health or welfare or the environment," the EPA has the more extensive power
to compel liable parties to perform the cleanup themselves. CERCLA § 106(a).
An especially thorny problem resulting from CERCLA involves liability for lending insti-
tutions that may "own or operate" sites in violation of CERCLA. CERCLA § 101(20)(A).
For a recent discussion of lender liability for environmental obligations, see Bruce P Howard
& Melissa K. Gerard, Lender Liability Under CERCLA: Sorting Out the Mixed Signals, 64 S.
CAL. L. Rzv. 1187 (1991).
4. The costs associated with this effort may reach as high as $750 billion by some
estimates, although so far only $11 billion has been used to clean up 84 sites. Peter Hong &
Michele Galen, The Toxic Mess Called Superfund, Bus. WK., May 11, 1992, at 32.
5. See, e.g., United States v. LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 944 F.2d 997 (2d
Cir. 1991).
6. Title I of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549
(codified as amended at I1 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988 & Supp. 1992)).
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
bankruptcy process provides for equality of distribution and an opportunity
to reorgamze and save potentially viable businesses. The Code reaches the
equality principle by cumulating the debtor's available assets for distribution
in the bankruptcy estate7 and creating a process for creditors to file claims
against the estate for amounts owed.' The reorgamzing debtor files a plan
under which claims or portions thereof are satisfied. 9 The portion of the
claim impaired (or left unsatisfied) by the distribution is discharged and the
debtor is relieved of the obligation. 0 As a result of this procedure, debtors
have the potential to reorgamze their obligations without liquidating and
dissolving."
The policies of CERCLA conflict with the goals of bankruptcy, creating
problematic results for petitiomng debtors and often resulting in the "sudden
death" of otherwise viable firms under the burden of environmental liabil-
ities. 12 Environmental statutes, such as CERCLA, seek to protect the envi-
ronment and the public health and safety by restraimng polluters from
further damaging the environment and by assessing the costs of cleanup to
the responsible parties. 3
Two substantial problems arise from the current conflict between bank-
ruptcy and environmental law. Presently, the Code makes no provision for
environmental obligations, which had not reached the public's consciousness
when the Code was drafted. 14 Courts are therefore left to determine whether
environmental obligations are "claims" in bankruptcy, and if so, what kind
of priority they should have. To solve this problem, Congress should refine
the definition of "claim" to include environmental obligations owed to
federal and state environmental authorities and accord these claims the same
status as claims of other governmental units. 5
7 i1 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. 1992) (providing that "all legal or equitable
interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case" are property of the
estate).
8. Id. § 501.
9. Id. §§ 1101-1174.
10. Id. § I141(d).
II. Chapter 11 of the Code establishes a detailed procedure for troubled corporations to
reorganize and liquidate debts in order to maximize the going concern value of the corporation.
However, the rationale for reorganization does not mean that every financially troubled business
should be revived in Chapter Il, since many corporations do not have sufficient going concern
value to warrant reorgamzation.
12. See generally Arlene E. Mirsky et al., The Interface Between Bankruptcy and Environ-
mental Laws, 46 Bus. LAW 623 (1991).
13. EPA Administrator William K. Reilly claimed that this liability scheme was intended
to create "a new environmental ethic [for] industrial America." Hong & Galen, supra note 4,
at 33.
14. See Gary E. Claar, The Case for a Bankruptcy Code Priority for Environmental
Cleanup Claims, 18 WM. MrrcHELL L. REv. 29, 34-35 (1992).
15. An important recent article similarly proposes such treatment, but pnoritizes environ-
mental claims ahead of other governmental units. See id. Arguably, no distinction is warranted
between claims by environmental authorities and other governmental units, all of which receive
distributions from the estate after secured creditors. See infra Appendix B.
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The general policies of bankruptcy and environmental law create the other
problematic situation: the use of assets of the bankruptcy estate (which
includes encumbered property) 6 to satisfy environmental obligations at the
expense of a creditor's security. Congress could alleviate this problem by
specifically recognizing the special status of environmental obligations as
claims of governmental units, thereby rejecting the argument that CERCLA
claims are adrmnistrative expenses to be paid ahead of secured creditors.
Such a move would protect the interests of secured creditors during pendency
of the case and reject proposals for using security to finance cleanups. 7
This Note proposes a framework for handling environmental obligations
in bankruptcy. Part I outlines the cleanup scheme established by CERCLA,
including the settlement process under the 1986 amendments. Part II focuses
on whether environmental obligations are claims in the bankruptcy process,
and the related problem of the priority such obligations should receive. Part
III discusses the impact of environmental obligations on secured creditors
by considenng what property of the bankruptcy estate may be used to
finance reclamation. Part IV concludes with a proposal for reconciling the
conflict between the policies underlying bankruptcy and environmental laws
by amending the Bankruptcy Rules and Code to recognize the importance
of environmental claims. While this approach accepts the importance of
environmental reclamation, it does so without abusing the procedures guid-
ing bankruptcy.
I. ENVIRONE NTAL RECLAMATION UNDER CERCLA
To cope with the growing problem of hazardous wastes, Congress, in
1980, enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act (CERCLA) and empowered the EPA with funding and
enforcement authority for hazardous waste sites."8 Congress also created the
16. "Property of the estate" in bankruptcy includes assets encumbered by liens of secured
creditors. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1988 & Supp. 1992).
17. Some secured lenders suffer due to the expanding notion of lender liability for cleanups
because the EPA had not defined the scope of the secured creditor exemption, which provides
that creditors, in merely protecting their security, will not be held as owners or operators.
CERCLA § 101(20)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988). See also Howard & Gerard, supra
note 3. The EPA recently clarified the area by issuing a rule interpreting the scope of the
secured creditor exemption to give lenders more latitude in foreclosing and selling contaminated
property. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344-01 (Apr. 29, 1992) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 300). The
rule departs from United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (l1th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 752 (1991), where a federal court imposed liability based on the secured
creditor's "capacity" to influence the environmental policies of the debtor. Id. at 1557.
18. Although this Note will focus almost exclusively on CERCLA, other environmental
regulatory and reclamation statutes may impose some measure of liability that could be
important in bankruptcy.
Congress approached the "last remaimng loophole in environmental law, that of unregulated
1992]
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Hazardous Waste Response Trust Fund, or Superfund,1 9 to facilitate expe-
dited cleanup of the nation's hazardous waste sites by the EPA.
CERCLA provides substantial liability for polluters. Liability may anse
from one of two routes: the EPA may order a party to clean up a site, 20
or the EPA may undertake the cleanup itself and utilize the Superfund. 21
Response costs expended from the Superfund give rise to liability under
CERCLA, 22 which permits the EPA to bring an action to recover the costs
of cleanup from the potentially responsible parties (PRPs).23 Liability under
CERCLA is strict, 24 and PRPs may be held jointly and severally liable. z.
This statute empowers the EPA with the authority to impose enormous
liability on responsible parties.
Before undertaking an actual cleanup, site studies must be prepared to
determine the scope of the contamination. These studies include a Remedial
Investigation (RI), focusing on the nature and threat of the contamination,
land disposal of discarded materials and hazardous wastes," H.R. REP. No. 1491, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 4 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6238, 6241, by enacting the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) to govern the treatment, storage, and disposal of
hazardous wastes. RCRA provides for permanent injunctions if there exists a potential danger
to public health or the environment and civil fines for damages. CERCLA § 128(h)(1). Both
CERCLA and RCRA impose liability on owners or operators of the facility. 42 U.S.C. §
7003(a) (1988) (RCRA); CERCLA §§ 101(20)(A), 107(a). RCRA significantly overlaps with
CERCLA, in fact, actions under both statutes are often consolidated. See, e.g., United States
v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 821 (1988); United States v. Aceto Agric. Chem. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989)
(analyzing RCRA and CERCLA similarly). Due to this overlap, claims under both statutes
should be treated similarly in bankruptcy.
Many states have also enacted counterparts to these statutes that vary drastically from one
state to another. For example, New Jersey's Environmental Cleanup Responsibility Act (ECRA),
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:1K-6 to -13 (West 1991), extends beyond CERCLA or RCRA and
imposes a notification requirement on property owners before they may transfer or close
(including some corporate reorganizations) certain businesses or property. Id.
While RCRA and CERCLA actions are often the most threatening to reorganizations due
to the magnitude of the obligations, liability also arises from other federal environmental
regulatory statutes. The Clean Air Act, the primary federal air pollution control legislation,
sets ambient air control standards and emission limitations. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1988 &
Supp. 1992). The Clean Water Act, formerly the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, creates
the mechanism for controlling water pollution by requiring discharge permits, monitoring, and
reporting. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988 & Supp. 1990).
19. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657
(1988 & Supp. 1992)).
20. CERCLA § 104.
21. Id. § 106(a), (b).
22. Id. § 107.
23. Id. § 107(a). CERCLA uses the term "responsible parties" not in § 107 but in §
104(a)(1), the section providing for cleanup orders. The scope of "potentially responsible
parties" is quite broad, encompassing present and past owners and operators of facilities,
transporters, and generators. CERCLA § 107(a). For a comprehensive discussion of these
terms, see SHELDON M. NOVICK, THE LAW OF ENVIRONMMNTAL PROTCnTION § 13.05(3)(d)(i)
(1992). "Owner and operator" are defined in CERCLA § 101(20)(A).
24. United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
25. Id.
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and a Feasibility Study (FS), which details possible remedies. 26 These studies
may take years to prepare, even when complying with the timetables added
by Congress in the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of
1986 (SARA). 27 The EPA has estimated the average cost of the RI/FS to
be $800,000, with complex studies rising far beyond this figure.28 Together,
the RI/FS provides the roadmap for the site cleanup. 29
II. ENVIRONMENTAL OBLIGATIONS: CLAIMS AND PRIORITY
The Bankruptcy Code offers little guidance to courts approaching the
exigencies of environmental impediments to reorganization. The Code pre-
ceded CERCLA, which was the first environmental statute to impose liability
directly on polluters. Nevertheless, courts have attempted to apply traditional
methods of claim and priority classification to environmental obligations,
often resulting in inconsistent results that favor one statute at the expense
of the other.
A. Environmental Obligations and "Claims" in Bankruptcy
The Code defines a "claim" broadly to include a "right to payment" 0
or a "right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such
breach gives rise to a right to payment."3 The legislative history recognizes
the breadth of such a definition, proclaimung that "the [Code] contemplates
that all legal obligations of the debtor, no matter how remote or contingent,
will be able to be dealt with in the bankruptcy case. It permits the broadest
possible relief in the bankruptcy court."'32 The broad definition of "claim"
furthers the goals of bankruptcy reorganizations by permitting claim holders
to participate in the reorganization process to the extent of the allowed
26. See NovicK, supra note 23, § 13.05(3)(f)(ii)(A).
27. CERCLA § 116. The Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA)
replemshed the Superfund and strengthened the EPA's enforcement authority. Pub. L. No.
99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). SARA also
established an explicit right of contribution and included much-needed statutory guidance for
settlements under CERCLA. CERCLA § 113(f)(2), SARA § 113(b) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
9613(0(2) (Supp. 1990)). These amendments reinforced CERCLA and added procedural re-
quirements for compliance.
28. DAVID SivE & FRANK FRIEDMAN, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 132
(1987).
29. A common practice is the preparation of a "work plan" that commences before an
RI/FS to guide the cost outlay for the studies and provide the appropriate sampling procedures
for the site. Id. at 132-33.
30. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (1988 & Supp. 1992). See generally RICHARD F BROUDE,
REORGANIZATIONS UNDER CHAPTER 11 OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE 6A-1 to -35 (1992).
31. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(B).
32. H. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 309 (1978), repnnted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5963, 6266; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 21-22 (1978) reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5787, 5807-08.
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claim33 and by providing debtors with a plan that utilizes the existing pool
of assets while not entirely crippling future operations.
Courts have applied this broad definition to environmental claims with
little consistency, finding that in some cases a "right to payment" reducible
to money springs from an environmental obligation while in others it does
not.3 4 For example, in In re Chateaugay Corp.," the Second Circuit gave
an expansive reading to "contingent claim," holding that claims for response
costs arising under CERCLA 6 related to pre-petition releases or threatened
releases of hazardous wastes by the debtor constitute claims that may be
discharged in bankruptcy.3 7
33. See 11 U.S.C. § 1124.
34. The legislative statements accompanying the Code recognize this problem but do nothing
to alleviate it. See BANKRUPTCY CODE, RULES AND FORMS, Legislative Statements to § 101
(West 1991).
35. United States v. LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1991).
36. These are response costs within § 107 of CERCLA. CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607
(1988).
37 In re Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 1004-05. Chateaugay, a subsidiary of the conglomerate
LTV Corporation, had listed numerous "contingent claims" held by the EPA and enforcement
officials of all fifty states and the District of Columbia. Chateaugay informed the regulatory
authorities that it expected to confirm a plan discharging all listed obligations traceable to
Chateaugay's pre-petition conduct, including obligations for response costs incurred post-
petition. The government brought an action for a declaratory judgment that response costs
incurred post-petition are not dischargeable as pre-petition claims within the meaning of the
Code. The district court held that where "there has been a pre-petition release or threatened
release of hazardous waste, there does exist an event that would render any claims arising
from that circumstance dischargeable pursuant to the broad definition of 'claim' set forth in
the Bankruptcy Code." United States v. Chateaugay Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 112
B.R. 513, 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff'd sub nom. United States v. LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay
Corp.), 944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1991). This decision attempted to limit the number of non-
dischargeable environmental injunctions for pre-petition releases to those where the EPA could
not reduce the order to a payment of money. Kenneth E. Aaron, Chateaugay Appeal-The
Crash at the Intersection of Bankruptcy and Environmental Law, BANCKR. L. DAY (BNA),
Oct. 2, 1991, at 24-25. The court permitted only pre-petition actions of the debtor to fall
within the definition of "claim."
After presenting the broad definition of a claim, the Second Circuit affirmed, formulating
a nexus requirement for determining when the claim arose. In re Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at
1005. Finding that the EPA was "acutely aware" of the debtor and others subject to regulation,
the court stated that this relationship provided "sufficient 'contemplation' of contingencies"
that the EPA could bring suit under CERCLA for response costs, creating a "contingent
claim" under the Code. Id. While holding that the pre-petition release was a dischargeable
claim, the court nevertheless created an opportunity for the EPA to use post-petition orders
for pre-petition releases that would fall outside the broad scope of dischargeable claims. See
Aaron, supra, at 25. The Second Circuit's nexus requirement is unfortunate, for agency
awareness as the basis of a claim is a difficult subjective requirement. The nexus test provides
little hope for consistency in judicial resolution of environmental liabilities in bankruptcy.
While this requirement may define limits for the financial community, the Second Circuit's
opinion creates incentives for mischief in the claim filing process. Daniel Wise, Courts Rule
on Cleanup Costs, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 14, 1991, at 38 (quoting environmental specialist Martin
Baker). Orders issued by the EPA could survive bankruptcy if framed with the dual objectives
of removing waste and stopping pollution in mind, leading to an incentive for the EPA to
alter its enforcement process to avoid bankruptcy classification. Almost all pre-petition releases
[Vol. 68:233
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Instead of relying on the district court's determination of the timing of
the release, the Second Circuit focused on the effect of the injunction
involved.38 If the injunction was only to clean up pre-petition waste, it was
a dischargeable claim since the order "does no more than impose an
obligation entirely as an alternative to a payment right."3 9 But an injunction
imposing -obligations to "end[ ] or ameliorate[ ] current pollution . . is
not a claim."'' An injunction accomplising the "dual objectives" of
removing wastes and halting continued pollution is also not a dischargeable
claim. By focusing on the EPA's option to accept payment as the require-
ment of a claim, the court recogmzed that "most environmental injunctions
will fall on the non-'claim' side of the line."' 4 1 The court believed this
position to be most faithful to previous Supreme Court rulings on matters
in this area.42
On the heels of In re Chateaugay, another case provided evidence of
judicial difficulty with environmental obligations. In In re Dant & Russell,43
the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's allowance of a claim for expenses
already incurred for cleanup under CERCLA, but the court reversed the
lower court's allowance of response costs not yet incurred for cleanup. 44 By
could be subject to a nonclainm injunction that would continue after confirmation of a
reorganization plan, thereby jeopardizing the feasibility of the plan. See Aaron, supra, at 25.
The concern with feasibility did not go unheeded by the Second Circuit in In re Chateaugay,
which noted that reorganizations may not be possible if all CERCLA response costs are
exempted from the bankruptcy process. In re Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 1005. This court,
however, conditioned the claim on the future operations of the debtor instead of future
existence of the waste. By disregarding the district court's careful balance of when a claim
occurs, the Second Circuit has created a procedure that may lead to the failure of future
reorganization plans.
38. In re Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 1007.
39. Id. at 1008.
40. Id. (emphasis added).
41. Id.
42. See Oluo v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 (1985) (holding that since obligation could only be
satisfied by payment of money, obligation was a claim); Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey
Dept. of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494 (1986) (holding that property could not be abandoned
by the debtor under I1 U.S.C. § 554(a) in violation of state environmental laws).
43. Dant & Russell, Inc. v. Burlington N.R.R. (In re Dant & Russell, Inc.), 951 F.2d 246
(9th Cir. 1991).
44. Id. at 250. The debtor had leased -property from Burlington Northern Railroad (BN)
to operate its wood treatment plant. The debtor renewed its lease during the bankruptcy case
in the ordinary course of business as permitted under 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(1) (1988). During
the lease period, the debtor dumped toxic wastes on the property, which BN cleaned up. BN
filed a claim in the debtor's bankruptcy case for costs incurred and future response costs,
which the lower court allowed.
In reversing the allowance of future response costs, the Ninth Circuit stressed CERCLA's
provision that costs must be incurred in order to be recovered, part of the policy of encouraging
immediate actual cleanup. The Ninth Circuit focused on the term "incurred" in discussing
whether costs should be allowed, a path not previously taken by courts in determining when
a claim arises, holding that since BN had not yet incurred much of its claimed amount, it
19921
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concentrating on whether costs were incurred, the court created yet another
approach for environmental claims.
Another recent case takes a different approach to the claim question. In
re National Gypsum Co.4 5 held that all liabilities, whether listed by the
debtor or not, "based on pre-petition conduct that can be fairly contem-
plated by the parties at the time of Debtors' [sic] bankruptcy are claims
under the Code.''46 Judge Sanders departed from the In re Chateaugay
court's use of contingent claims, stating instead-that "the only meamngful
distinction is one that distinguishes between costs associated with pre-
petition conduct resulting in a release or threat of release that could have
been 'fairly' contemplated by the parties; and those that could not have
been 'fairly' contemplated by the parties." 47
With each decision approaching the very existence of environmental claims
differently, courts provide parties with little guidance for future actions,
which may lead to the failure of many reorganization attempts.
B. Estimating the Amount of the Claim
The Code gives courts wide discretion to estimate contingent or unliqui-
dated claims under section 502(c).48 While the procedure for estimating
claims is less than clear, 49 the provision nevertheless permits courts handling
bankruptcies to determine the amount of a contingent or unliquidated
claim .5 0
Courts have utilized the claim estimation procedure in fixing the claim
amount most notably in product liability and shareholder actions. For
example, a court estimated the future recovery of victims of the Dalkon
could not recover this portion from the estate.
The effect of this holding may be a temporary disallowance of claims that will resurface
later in the reorganization (through a motion for reconsideration under I1 U.S.C. § 5020)).
Another possible result is subsequent suits against the reorgamzed corporation for costs incurred
post-petition (since unincurred costs could not be recovered in the reorganization).
45. 139 B.R. 397 (N.D. Tex. 1992).
46. Id. at 409.
47. Id. at 407-08 (footnotes omitted). Judge Sanders went on to provide a list of factors
for "fair contemplation"- knowledge of a site in which a PRP may be liable, listing on the
National Priorities List (NPL), notification by the EPA of potential liability, commencement
of the EPA investigation, and incurrence of response costs. Id. at 408. These factors would
apply specifically to response costs under § 107 of CERCLA and not § 106 orders. For a
discussion of the differences between §§ 106 and 107, see In re CMC Heartland Partners, 966
F.2d 1143 (7th Cir. 1992).
48. 11 U.S.C. § 502(c) states:
(c) There shall be estimated for purposes of allowance under this section-
(1) any contingent or unliquidated claim, the fixing or liquidation of which,
as the case may be, would unduly delay the administration of the case; or
(2) any right to payment arising from a right to an equitable remedy for breach
of performance.
Id.
49. BROtrE, supra note 30, at 6A-27.
50. The EPA may contend that the bankruptcy court, as an Article I court, does not have
[Vol. 68:233
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Shield, eventually setting the liability at $1.4 billion for injury claimants. 5'
Another court approached estimation by assessing the claimants' chances
of prevailing on their claims in state court, fixing at zero the amount of
the claim for reorganization because the court believed that the shareholders
could not establish their claim by a "preponderance of the evidence." '52
Claim estimation has been applied to environmental liabilities only re-
cently, in a further proceeding in the National Gypsum bankruptcy." That
court estimated the amount of the response costs and natural resource
damages under CERCLA after hearing testimony from expert witnesses of
the debtor and the EPA.54
Claim estimation could be effective for environmental claims for response
costs. While future cleanup costs will be uncertain, as future tort recoveries
are in product liability claims, the court may still be able to estimate cleanup
expenses so as not to "unduly delay the admnistration of the case." 55 The
balance struck by courts in product liability cases could apply to environ-
mental claims, especially after the In re National Gypsum ruling, although
court estimation may require a more structured procedure. 56
C. Priority of Environmental Obligations
If the obligation is a claim, the Code requires that it fit within one of
five categories: secured claims, admimstrative expenses, priority claims (such
as tax claims held by governmental units), unsecured claims, or equity
interests. 57 Classification within the Code is critical to reorganizations, for
jurisdiction to estimate an environmental claim. Courts have not reached this issue, but
decisions in other matters may permit discretion. See BROUDE, supra note 30, at 2-36 to -50.
51. Menard-Sanford v. Mabey (In re A.H. Robins, Inc.), 880 F.2d 694 (4th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 959 (1989).
52. Bittner v. Borne Chemical, 691 F.2d 134 (3d Cir. 1982). This decision sparked much
criticism, for it was seen as a return to the cumbersome method of the old 1898 Bankruptcy
Act. See BENJAMIN WErNRAUB & ArAN N. R.EsNCK, BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL 5-18 to -24
(1986). "Congress in Section 502(c) must have intended that if the claims are estimated in the
bankruptcy court, the proceeding in state court is rendered moot and, absent some extraordinary
circumstance, should not be permitted to go forward." BROUDE, supra note 30, at 6A-28.
53. Court in Texas Produces First Estimation of U.S. CERCLA Costs, Resource Damages,
BAN r. L. DAiLY (BNA) (July 9, 1992) (discussing In re National Gypsum, No. 390-37213-
SAF-I1, (Bankr. N.D. Tex. June 24, 1992) (unpublished opinion)) [hereinafter In re National
Gypsum II].
54. Id. The judge also demed administrative expense priority for the estimated amount,
stating that such priority would only be available if the government was abating an "imminent
and identifiable threat" under CERCLA § 106, 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (1988). Id.
55. 11 U.S.C. § 502(c) (1988).
56. For the proposed procedure, see infra Appendix A.
57. Torwico Electronics, Inc. v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection (In re Torwico
Electronics, Inc.), 131 B.R. 561 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1991). While administrative expenses are a
type of priority claim, many courts view "priority claim" as a term of art to refer to claims
under CERCLA § 507(a)(2)-(8). Id. at 565. Some commentators argue that administrative
expenses are just a subset of priority claims. The distinction is made here so that the later
discussion of priority claims will be clearer.
19921
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status determines payment priority. Courts have taken the position that
environmental obligations are either administrative expenses or unsecured
clamims.5
The Code grants administrative expense priority for the "actual, necessary
costs and expenses of preserving the estate"5 9 in order to allow businesses
to continue functioning during the bankruptcy proceeding. These expenses
are paid first after secured claims.60
Environmental authorities will typically submit that response costs under
CERCLA section 107 are administrative expenses of the estate, and a number
of courts have agreed with this characterization. 6 Granting administrative
expense priority to environmental cleanup obligations jeopardizes any po-
tential reorganization, since adminstrative expenses must be paid in cash
before the plan may be confirmed. 62 Reorganizing firms typically will be
58. Courts have almost uniformly taken the position that orders under CERCLA § 106(a)
are administrative expenses because these actions involve the government acting pre-petition
"to abate an 'imminent and identifiable threat."' In re National Gypsum II, supra note
53.
59. I1 U.S.C. § 503(b)(l)(A).
60. Id. § 507(a)(I).
61. The leading example of administrative expense prority for CERCLA § 107 claims is
In re Wall Tube & Metal Products Co., 831 F.2d 118 (6th Cir. 1987). Persuaded that permitting
the obligations to be treated as general unsecured claims would favor a business in bankruptcy
over other similar businesses, the court stated that such costs were part of the "actual,
necessary costs of preserving the estate" under § 503(b) and as such were entitled to the
pnority. Id. at 124. The court refused to allow Chapter 7 to supplant 28 U.S.C. § 959(b),
which states in part that the debtor in possession "shall manage and operate the property in
his possession according to the valid laws of the State in which such property is situated."
The court applied the Supreme Court's test from Reading Co. v. Brown, 391 U.S. 471 (1968),
for determining priority status, stating that while the existing creditors were not in a dilemma
of their own making, there was no reason to relieve them from liability while imposing the
costs on others equally innocent. In re Wall Tube, 831 F.2d at 123 (quoting Reading, 391
U.S. at 482-83).
In re Wall Tube imposes the costs of cleanup on the general unsecured creditors who are
faced with the prospect of no return at all after satisfying the environmental obligations. The
case creates an unusual incentive on the regulatory body to force the business into bankruptcy.
Such an incentive is completely at odds with the Code's equal distribution mechanism and
provides environmental authorities with pnority even over other governmental entities.
But the decision is misleading, for the "others equally innocent" are not other businesses
as creditors, but rather the taxpayers through the conduit of the environmental authorities. In
re Wall Tube preferred the readily available deep pocket of creditors over the environmental
agency with enforcement responsibility. Granting administrative expense priority to environ-
mental authorities merely forces unsecured creditors instead of the government to bear the
costs of cleanup.
Other courts apparently have found the environmental policies compelling. See In re Stevens,
68 B.R. 774 (D. Me. 1987); In re T.P Long Chemical, 45 B.R. 278 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985).
Still others permit administrative expense priority only upon an "imminent and identifiable
harm" to the public health and safety. Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl.
Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 507 n.9 (1986); see also In re National Gypsum Co., 139 B.R. 397,
413 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1992) (permitting pnority for pre-petition costs so long as the costs
"were necessitated by conditions that posed an imminent and identifiable harm to the
environment and public health").
62. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(A).
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unable to pay out a massive expenditure such as an environmental obligation,
and hence the reorganization will fail. By classifying environmental obli-
gations as admimstrative expenses, many reorganizing debtors are doomed
to "sudden death" from the crippling blow of this immediate cash payment.
Conversely, some courts have held that environmental obligations arise
before the filing of the petition and are general unsecured claims. 63 This
classification facilitates reorganizations by permitting debtors to pay small
dividends to environmental authorities to discharge cleanup claims. This
action is likely objectionable, for this classification grants no deference to
the environmental policies undergirding a comprehensive federal statute such
as CERCLA. Furthermore, debtors with environmental obligations could
declare bankruptcy simply to avoid the claims and gain a competitive
advantage in bankruptcy, a prospect at odds with the general policy of
substantive consistency in and out of bankruptcy 64
Faced with the all-or-nothing decision of whether environmental obliga-
tions are "the actual, necessary costs of preserving the estate ' 65 or general
unsecured claims, courts have responded with little consistency. "Preserving
the estate" has become an elusive, fact-specific determination that provides
little guidance for potential litigants.
The priority issue is also quite difficult when further releases of hazardous
waste or improvements to an existing treatment system or site occur after
the debtor files the bankruptcy petition. In one such case," the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the lower court and bankruptcy court holdings that there was
"insufficient evidence establishing that [debtor] added any significant con-
tamination to the site after the filing of Chapter 11."67 In addition, the
debtor had improved its waste containment system and had modified its
operations to prevent further contamination." The findings led the district
court to refuse administrative expense priority, a conclusion upheld by the
Ninth Circuit. 69
Consideration of ameliorative efforts against continuing pollution in de-
termining priority is beyond the scope of the bankruptcy courts (and maybe
other bodies, because segregating and tracing waste is nearly impossible),
63. Burlington N.R.R. v. Dant & Russell, Inc. (In re Dant & Russell, Inc.), 853 F.2d 700,
708-09 (9th Cir. 1988) [hereinafter In re Dant & Russell I] (holding that absent explicit
legislative direction, claims for cleanup costs arsing pre-petition should not receive admlms-
trative expense priority); Walsh v. West Virgima (In re Security Gas & Oil, Inc.), 70 B.R.
786, 795 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1987). But see In re Peerless Plating Co., 70 B.R. 943 (Bankr.
W.D. Mich. 1987).
64. See generally THomSm H. JACKSON, Tan Loaic AND Ltnns oF BANKRuPTcY LAW (1986).
65. II U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A).
66. Dant & Russell, Inc. v. Burlington N.R.R. (In re Dant & Russell, Inc.), 951 F.2d 246
(9th Cir. 1991) [hereinafter In re Dant & Russell II].
67. Id. at 250 (emphasis added).
68. Id.
69. Id.
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although many courts are attempting similar calculations. This monumental
problem further begs for a simplified approach to environmental obligations.
Classifying environmental obligations as administrative expenses would
doom many reorganizations. Few debtors with environmental liabilities
would be able to pay off the obligations in cash at the time of confirmation
as required under the Code for adnmnistrative expenses.7 0 The result would
be "sudden death" for otherwise viable debtors with environmental liabil-
ities. But classification of CERCLA obligations as general unsecured claims
fails to recognize the important policies guiding the environmental laws.
The current approach is confused and provides little guidance for parties
to a reorgamzation.
III. SECURED CREDrrORS AND FNANCING THE CLEANUP
While the current application of bankruptcy to environmental obligations
may supply the death blow to the debtor's chances of reorganization, secured
creditors may suffer substantial injury at the same time. Courts in their
rush to solve environmental problems have in effect taken security interests
from creditors in order to finance cleanup obligations. This judicial move
may upset the balance explicit in the Code by failing to adequately protect
the interests of secured creditors during the pendency of the bankruptcy
case.
A. The Automatic Stay
Creditors holding claims against the debtor may not immediately move
to liquidate these claims in bankruptcy. Reorganizations require ample time
for the debtor to restructure its assets and liabilities before reemergence.
To provide this time, all entities (including governmental entities such as
environmental authorities) are stayed from taking action against property
of the debtor upon the filing of the bankruptcy petition .7 The automatic
stay provision of the Code provides the debtor with a breathing spell and
prevents creditors or governmental units from acting to collect against the
debtor or interfering with property of the estate until the bankruptcy
proceeding has run its course. The automatic stay is, however, limited to
only those actions which could have been commenced pre-petition or attempt
70. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(A) (1988).
71. Section 362(a) provides in part:
[A] petition filed under section 301, 302, or 303 of this-title ... operates as a
stay, applicable to all entities, of the commencement or continuation
of a judicial, adxmmstrative, or other action or proceeding against the debtor
that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the case
under this title
11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1).
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to collect on pre-petition claims. Claims arising post-petition are not affected
by the automatic stay.
The Code recognizes two specific exceptions applicable to governmental
authorities with claims against the debtor. The first is found in section
362(b)(4), which exempts commencement of actions within the police power
of the state from the automatic stay.7 This section permits the state to
obtain an injunction to protect the public health and safety, such as to
prevent the debtor from violating environmental laws.73 But the legislative
history suggests that the police power exception is to be given a narrow
construction and should not apply to "actions by a governmental unit to
protect a pecumary interest in property of the debtor or property of the
estate." 74 This thin distinction between the pecuniary interest and public
safety exists to prevent governmental units from enjoying priority over other
creditors and from using assets of the estate absent danger to public health
and safety.
The other provision that environmental authorities have used to avoid
the stay is section 362(b)(5), which exempts from the automatic stay en-
forcement of nonmonetary judgments against the debtor.75 This section
carves out a narrow exception to the stay, permitting enforcement of
judgments obtained before the commencement of the case. Courts have
wrestled with whether enforcement of cleanup orders is permitted under
this exception or whether it would be barred as an attempt to enforce a
monetary judgment against the debtor, an action precluded by the stay.76
Courts have walked a tightrope between the competing policies of the
automatic stay and the environmental laws. For example, in Penn Terra v.
Department of Environmental Resources,'77 the Third Circuit construed
section 362(b)(4) broadly, permitting the state to retain its police power
while limiting the scope of "enforcement of a monetary judgment. 7 8
72. Id. § 362(b)(4).
73. See, e.g., Walsh v. West Virginia (In re Security Gas & Oil, Inc.), 70 B.R. 786, 795
(Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1987) (holding that order to cease activities violating state law fell within
§ 362(b)(4)).
74. 124 CoNG. Rnc. S17409 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978); 124 CoNo. Rac. Hi092 (daily ed.
Sept. 28, 1978).
75. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(5).
76. Id. § 362(a)(2).
77. 733 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1984). Penn Terra had been violating environmental laws in
operating coal mines. The Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources (DER) cited
Penn Terra for the violation, and the two entered a consent decree. Penn Terra never complied
with the consent decree, and it later filed for a Chapter 7 liquidation. The DER sought a
preliminary injunction to force the debtor to comply with the consent decree and to correct
environmental violations, which the state court granted.
78. Id. at 273. Since the remedy sought did not compensate for "past wrongful acts" but
instead would protect against "potential future harm," the injunction fell within the police
power exemption to the stay. Id. (emphasis added).
The court buttressed its decision by stating that the "injunction was, neither in form nor
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This decision leaves debtors with little solace, especially since most cleanup
orders force action regardless of cost.79 Most courts confronting this prob-
lem, however, have followed Penn Terra and its functional approach to the
automatic stay. 0 But the result of such an expansive police power exemption
would be to doom reorganizing businesses by granting priority to environ-
mental authorities over other creditors affected by the stay. Reorganizing
businesses would see the existing pool quickly depleted by environmental
obligations, often forcing complete liquidation.
The automatic stay is a critical tool of bankruptcy that temporarily shields
debtors from their creditors. But while it is a powerful protection, the
automatic stay does not grant debtors unbndled discretion to use encum-
bered property of the estate at the expense of their creditors.
B. Adequate Protection and the Use of Estate Property
Closely tied to the stay is the concept of "adequate protection," which
preserves the secured creditor's benefit of the bargain by protecting her
security while the debtor is in bankruptcy.8' Regardless of the nature of the
debtor's business, a secured creditor may petition to lift the stay "for cause,
including the lack of adequate protection .... 82 Methods of adequate
protection include periodic cash payments, additional liens, or the "indu-
bitable equivalent. 813 Adequate protection is the trade off for the debtor's
use of encumbered property dunng the bankruptcy proceeding.8' Without
the inclusion of encumbered property in the estate, reorganizations would
almost certainly fail; without compensation for decline' in value of the
substance, the type of remedy traditionally associated with the conventional money judg-
ment. Rather, the Commonwealth Court's injunction was meant to prevent future harm
to, and to restore, the environment." Id. at 278. By focusing not on the form of the action
but the harm it meant to address, which the court decided was not compensable by money
alone, the court found no attempt to enforce a money judgment arising from the injunction.
79. See Mirsky et al., supra note 12, at 637.
80. Commonwealth Oil Refining Co. v. United States EPA (In re Commonwealth Oil
Refining Co.), 805 F.2d 1175 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987)" United States
v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 818 F.2d 1077 (3d Cir. 1987); Walsh v. West Virginia (In
re Security Gas & Oil, Inc.), 70 B.R. 786, 795 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1987).
81. The concept of adequate protection was designed to "insure that the secured creditor
receives the value for which he bargained." S. RE. No. 989, supra note 32, at 53, reprinted
in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5839; H. REP. No. 595, supra note 32, at 339, reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6295. See generally Douglas Baird & Thomas Jackson, Corporate Reor-
ganizations and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate
Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U. Cm. L. Ra,. 97 (1984).
82. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (1988). The trustee bears the burden of proof on the issue- of
adequate protection in a heanng. Id. § 363(o). Bankruptcy Rule 4001 provides the appropriate
procedures for obtaining adequate protection. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4001 (1988).
83. 11 U.S.C. § 361.
84. Id. § 363. Recall that encumbered property is included in property of the estate under
§ 541(a)(1).
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collateral, the creditor would lose the benefit of her bargain. The need for
adequate protection is particularly compelling when the security is cash
collateral, and as a result, courts have closely scrutimzed the use of cash
collateral.85
Some courts seem willing to relax the adequate protection requirement in
order to finance an environmental cleanup. An indication of the relaxed
approach is In re Environmental Waste Control,a6 in which the district court
ordered a debtor to use estate property to comply with a cleanup order.8
A secured creditor claimed that such a holding both violated its right to
adequate protection within bankruptcy and deprived it of property without
just compensationa The court rejected these arguments, stating that "[the
secured creditor's] position regarding its priority over the estate's assets
must yield in light of the competing environmental harms." 8 9
The same secured creditor argued that the debtor could not draw on the
cash collateral without creditor consent or court authorization "in accor-
dance with the provisions of this section,"' 9 which required adequate pro-
tection. But the court authorized the EPA and the state environmental
authority to use the cash collateral toward cleanup.91
In order to use cash collateral, the debtor must move for court authori-
zation. 92 Upon such a motion, the court will hold a hearing at which it
85. See Sun Bank/Suncoast v. Earth Lite, Inc. (In re Earth Lite, Inc.), 9 B.R. 440 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 1981). See generally BRouDE, supra note 30, at 5-5 to -8.
86. 125 B.R. 546 (N.D. Ind. 1991).
87. Id. Environmental Waste Control (EWC), a landfill operator, filed for reorganization
after a consent decree was entered against it in a RCRA case. United States v. Environmental
Waste Control, 710 F Supp. 1172 (N.D. Ind. 1989), aff'd, 917 F.2d 327 (7th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, III S. Ct. 1621 (1991). All of EWC's liquid assets were cash collateral subject to the
secured claims of Resources Unlimited, Inc. (RUI). EWC had slightly over two million dollars
in cash, which had been decreasing rapidly due to the prohibition on mcormng shipments
under the RCRA decree. Since the cleanup would cost far more than the remaining value of
the estate, EWC sought to defer the environmental authorities until the bankruptcy court could
determine the relative rights of creditors. In re Environmental Waste Control, 125 B.R. at
549. But the court demed EWC's request, ordering EWC to comply with the cleanup order,
regardless of a total cost that would greatly exceed EWC's remaimng assets.
The strict language of the opinion should be somewhat limited, since RUI was arguably an
"owner or operator" within CERCLA § 101(20)(A) and may not have been the typical secured
creditor. The opinion, however, does not base its decision on the relationship between RUI
and EWC, but paints in broad strokes that could be applied to other creditors with less
involvement.
88. The constitutional argument is discussed infra notes 94-104 and accompanying text.
89. In re Environmental Waste Control, 125 B.R. at 552. The court stated that "the matter
of adequate protection is outside [the district court's] current scope" and within that of the
bankruptcy court, although the court's dictum may encourage a future holding in line with
environmental ends. Id.
90. 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(2)(B) (1988).
91. In re Environmental Waste Control, 125 B.R. at 552.
92. Fan. R. BANR. P. 4001(b) (1991).
1992]
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may "authorize the use of only that amount of cash collateral necessary to
avoid immediate and irreparable harm to the estate. '93
Avoidance of immediate harm to the estate is the sole apparent justifi-
cation for releasing a portion of the cash collateral. Such a stringent
requirement is the only way to protect the property interests of creditors in
cash collateral.
C. Constitutional Problems for Secured Creditors: The Loss of
Adequate Protection as a Taking
While the constitutional impact of CERCLA in bankruptcy has never
been litigated, other laws altering the position of secured creditors in
bankruptcy have generated constitutional concerns under the Fifth Amend-
ment Takings Clause.Y
Conflicts between the Code and CERCLA raise important constitutional
issues which few courts have yet to examine. Environmental obligations
93. FED. R. BANKR. P 4001(b)(2) (emphasis added). The court never mentioned tius
requirement in its opinion.
94. The Takings Clause states that "private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation." U.S. CoNsT. amend. V
The constitutional concerns generated by bankruptcy procedures have a long history. Under
President Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal, Congress attempted to stem the tide of farm
bankruptcies. One such action, the Frazier-Lemke Act, amended the Bankruptcy Act to permit
debtors to remain on their property, provided a five-year moratorium on state-law foreclosure
rights, and allowed for repurchase at a below-debt price. Pub. L. No. 73-486, 48 Stat. 1289
(1934). In Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935), the United
States Supreme Court held that retroactive enactment of this act deprived the secured creditor
of property rights in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Justice Brandeis, writing for the
Court, stated that no matter how grave the economic climate, "private property shall not be
thus taken even for a wholly public use without just compensation." Id. at 602. Shortly after
this decision, the Court distinguished the descendent of Frazier-Lemke and upheld it as a less
violative provision in Wright v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 273 (1940).
The Court later decided a case regarding mechanic liens that also involved a taking challenge.
In Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960), the Court held that the government's
action in confiscating unfinished ships under contract with the U.S. Navy constituted a taking
of private property by nullifying mechanic liens on the work in progress. The Court stated
that "the total destruction by the Government of all value of these liens, which constitute
compensable property, has every possible element of a Fifth Amendment 'taking' and is not
a mere 'consequential incidence' of a valid regulatory measure." Id. at 48.
United States v. Security Industrial Bank, 459 U.S. 70 (1982), affirmed the Court's position
in Radford and Armstrong. The case involved § 522(0 of the Code and its retroactive
application to the bank. This section allows the debtor to invalidate nonpossessory, nonpur-
chase-money liens on personal property, including household goods. The Court unanimously
agreed that the section could not be applied retroactively, but avoided the apparent constitu-
tional issue arising from the destruction of the bank's liens. For the majority, Justice Rehnquist
held that § 522(0 did not apply retroactively to liens perfected before passage of the Bankruptcy
Reform Act. He explicitly recognized that "the bankruptcy power is subject to the Fifth
Amendment's prohibition against taking private property without compensation," and for this
proposition he cited Radford. Id. at 75.
For an extremely thorough discussion of this line of cases, see John Ayer, Rethinking
Absolute Priority After Ahlers, 87 MICH. L. R-v. 963 (1989).
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create new problems that courts must address to protect the constitutional
rights of secured creditors in the bankruptcy process. Creditors may lose
constitutionally protected property rights as a result of the combination of
these powerful federal statutes.95
Bankruptcy alone does not effectuate a taking; the automatic stay and
its complementary provision of adequate protection for the secured party
satisfy Fifth Amendment due process requirements. 96 Since a security interest
is a property right protected by the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment, 97 a creditor receives protection within the bankruptcy proceeding from
reduction in value or total loss of her collateral through the concept of
"adequate protection." 98 A creditor may get relief from the stay upon
motion by showing that her collateral is not adequately protected. 9 So long
as adequate protection accompanies the stay, the creditor's constitutional
rights are preserved.
Few courts have addressed the constitutional argument in an environmen-
tal case. In In re Heldor Industries,°00 the bankruptcy court held that the
New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection could not use the
collateral of a secured creditor to finance a cleanup under the state's
Environmental Cleanup Responsibility Act (ECRA).10 1 The court refused to
95. Outside bankruptcy, creditors holding properly perfected security interests against a
debtor are entitled to recover the collateral and sell it to recover the proceeds. U.C.C. §§ 9-
503, -504. CERCLA permits the EPA to take a lien on real property to secure costs incurred
by the federal government for cleanup of that property, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(1) (1988), but these
liens are subordinate to previously perfected security interests.
96. See, e.g., Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Ruggiere (In re George Ruggiere Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc.), 727 F.2d 1017 (lith Cir. 1984).
97. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70.
98. 11 U.S.C. § 363 (1988); 11 U.S.C. § 361 (providing for appropnate types of adequate
protection); see also H. REP. No. 595, supra note 32, at 338-40, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5963, 6294-97.
99. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d).
100. 131 B.R. 578 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1991).
101. Id. In an attempt to balance the interests of debtors and creditors with the interest in
public health, many states have responded to local environmental problems with legislation
similar to CERCLA or RCRA. The best known of the state counterparts is New Jersey's
ECRA, which imposes a notification requirement on owners before they close or transfer
certain businesses or property. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:1K-6 to -13 (West 1991 & Supp.
1992). A few states have enacted "superliens," which afford priority to claims of state
environmental authorities over all previously perfected liens. See, e.g., Douglas Ballantine,
Note, Recovering Costs for Cleaning Up Hazardous Waste Sites: An Examination of State
Superlien Statutes, 63 INrD. L.J. 571 (1988). These statutes attempt to resolve the conflict
between bankruptcy and environmental law by ensuring that state agencies can recover costs
under priority Hens against the debtor's property ahead of even secured creditors. These state
statutes are not to be confused with CERCLA's lien provision, which grants the federal
government a Hen over real property subordinate to perfected security interests.
If these statutes attempt to alter the bankruptcy baseline, they run afoul of the Constitution.
For example, Torwico Electronics, Inc. v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection
(In re Torwico Electronics, Inc.), 131 B.R. 561 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1991), held that portions of
ECRA which attempt to limit the effect of the Code on cleanup obligations and create new
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allow the state to "simply... take the Bank's money to pay for a cleanup
merely because the Bank [had] the misfortune to be in the same case." 102
From the premise that security interests are property within the Fifth
Amendment, 103 the court stressed that
there is no satisfactory basis for arguing that although Code sections
361, 362(d)(1), 363(e), 364(d) and 507(b) provide that a secured creditor
must be compensated if the bankruptcy case causes a reduction in the
value of collateral, the creditor does not have to be compensated if the
state takes the creditor's money to pay for an environmental cleanup.1"
The court refused to permit the bank's security to be used to pay for the
cleanup when the bank had only the misfortune to lend to a polluter.
The In re Heldor court clearly expressed hostility to the State's attempt
to fall back on the bank as an insurer for the environmental obligations of
the debtor, since this dracoman result seemed beyond even the broad reach
of ECRA. Thus ruling would seem to apply with equal force to CERCLA,
which also does not require lenders to act as environmental insurers.
The impact of environmental laws in bankruptcy creates a constitutional
problem that can only be avoided by ensuring adequate protection for
secured lenders. Using cash collateral for environmental cleanups removes
this protection and deprives secured lenders of vested property rights in
violation of the Fifth Amendment.
obligations when the bankruptcy case is filed violate the supremacy clause of the Constitution.
In re Torwico Electronics involved a manufacturer of electronic transformers who leased
property that was found to be contaminated. When the debtor filed under Chapter 11, it listed
the state Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) and attorney general as unsecured
creditors holding disputed claims. But ECRA states, "[n]o obligations unposed by this act
shall constitute a lien or claim which may be limited or discharged in a bankruptcy proceeding.
All obligations imposed by tis act shall constitute continuing regulations imposed by the
State." Id. at 573. ECRA altered bankruptcy's baseline and provided the state with a right of
payment outside of bankruptcy. Redefining terms in case of bankruptcy violates bankruptcy's
equality principle and threatens any administration of the bankruptcy case.
Courts have typically disfavored such alterations to the federal scheme, and tis case was
no exception. Relying on the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, the court held that
ECRA's definition of "claim" conflicted with that of the Code and was therefore void on its
face. The court went on to say that "ft]o the extent that they require expenditure of a
bankruptcy estate's money, even 'continuing regulatory obligations' are either secured claims,
administrative expenses, priority claims or unsecured claims as defined by Congress, and are
subject to the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code regarding payment." Id. at 575. The court
found that the other provisions of ECRA providing for the treatment of cleanup obligations
also violated the supremacy clause. Id.
State statutes often respond more clearly to state environmental problems, but their coverage
must be limited so as to remain within legitimate constitutional boundaries. Although they
may define the nonbankruptcy terms, states may not alter the bankruptcy process by reshaping
the system's complex network of priorities and procedures. Only Congress has the authority
to redefine terms in bankruptcy.
102. In re Heldor, 131 B.R. at 586.
103. See United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70 (1982).
104. In re Heldor, 131 B.R. at 586.
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IV. A PROPOSED PROCESS FOR HANDLING ENVIRONMENTAL
OBLIGATIONS IN BANKRUPTCY
Environmental obligations by their nature complicate the bankruptcy
process. Reducing the obligation to money, deciding who is responsible for
what share, and fixing the total cost of the cleanup are all intractable
problems that lack the exactness desired in bankruptcy. Congress must
provide courts with guidance in this area, for resolving these issues based
on the current Bankruptcy Code and Rules will only result in greater
inconsistency.
Congress should act to resolve the confusion surrounding CERCLA
obligations in bankruptcy by amending the Code and Rules to create a
process for dealing with the problem. The process must conform to general
bankruptcy procedures, such as claim classification and priority, in order
to fulfill bankruptcy's promise. But the unique nature of environmental
obligations calls for a umque process to recognize the important federal
objectives of the environmental laws.
The following proposals reconcile the federal policies and provide a
framework for the treatment of environmental obligations in bankruptcy.
First, obligations for response costs to federal and state environmental
authorities should be classified as claims in bankruptcy in order to respond
to the needs of both the reorganizing debtor and the environmental au-
thorities. The amount of the claim would then be fixed either through
settlement with the EPA or estimation by the bankruptcy court in accordance
with the proposed process. Next, the claims should receive priority status,
like tax claims, in recognition of the special policies behind the environ-
mental laws. This treatment promotes equality among government entities,
while at the same time providing guidance to courts and avoiding the
"sudden death" problem of corporate reorganizations. Finally, resolution
of the quandary of creditor protection requires judicial deference to the
nghts of secured creditors by fortifying the Bankruptcy Rules relating to
adequate protection.
A. Claims
Environmental obligations for response costs should be classified as claims
for the reorganization. They resemble other obligations of the debtor that
may be satisfied by the expenditure of money.os As claims, the obligations
would entitle environmental authorities to participate in the reorganization,
105. This is not true for costs under CERCLA § 106. "Liability under section 106 in
conjunction with section 107(a)(1) is a different matter," since a cleanup order under CERCLA
§ 106 creates a "claim running with the land." In re CMC Heartland Partners, 966 F.2d
1143, 1146 (7th Cir. 1992).
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thus ensuring future payment to the appropriate agency. This treatment
recognizes the interest that environmental authorities have in present and
future actions of the debtor.
Courts have approached the issue of whether the Code's definition of
"claim" includes environmental liabilities for response costs in many dif-
ferent ways. The approach that could provide the most useful guidance for
all parties involved in environmental controversies involving bankruptcy may
be derived from In re National Gypsum.106
The court in In re National Gypsum held that only those response costs
based on pre-petition conduct by the debtor that are "fairly contemplated"
by the parties at the time of filing are claims within the Code. 1°7 This court
pronounced as factors to be considered in determining fair contemplation:
knowledge by the parties of a site of potential liability, listing on the
National Priorities List, notification by the EPA of liability, commencement
of investigation and cleanup activities, and incurrence of response costs.' m
This standard, more so than the broader and less clear standard from In
re Chateaugay,'09 will provide parties with substantial guidance as to what
constitutes a claim under the Code.
The In re National Gypsum approach to when a claim exists is more
practical for all parties than In re Chateaugay. While In re Chateaugay
requires that a claim would only arise upon "release or threatened release
of hazardous waste," 110 In re National Gypsum focuses on the relationship
between the parties and whether the liability would be fairly contemplated
by the parties at the filing of the petition."' The effect of In re National
Gypsum is to avoid the scientific dilemma of discerning which releases
occurred before the petition for bankruptcy was filed." 2 Tins approach
requires courts to determine whether the elements creating liability under
the Code arose pre-petition and thus were fairly contemplated by the parties,
not whether the EPA's claims under CERCLA were npe for adjudication.
In re National Gypsum's practical approach provides a rule based on
discernible legal factors for "fair contemplation"" 3 which should become
106. 139 B.R. 397 (N.D. Tex. 1992).
107. Id. at 407-08.
108. Id. at 408 (footnote omitted). While an NPL listing has "no direct legal consequence,"
it "signifies the EPA's belief that the site is releasing or likely to release hazardous substances."
In re CMC Heartland Partners, 966 F.2d at 1145.
109. United States v. LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1991);
see also supra notes 35-42 and accompanying text.
110. In re Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 1005; see also supra notes 35-42 and accompanying text.
Ill. In re National Gypsum, 139 B.R. at 409.
112. Waste migration tracking techniques currently do not permit authorities to determine
on what date a release occurred. Waste migration simply does not respect the filing of a
bankruptcy petition.
113. See supra note 47.
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the preferred approach to allowing environmental claims in the bankruptcy
process.
B. Determining the Amount of the Claim
Fixing the amount of the claim would involve a choice for the debtor:
settle with the EPA for an amount determined through a limited Remedial
Investigation and Feasibility Study (RI/FS) or estimate the claim under the
Code. The settlement procedure would require a shortened RI/FS process
and increased cooperation between the debtor and the EPA.
Estimation of the environmental claim under Code section 502(c) would
fix the amount of the liability. Estimation settles the problem of "incurred
costs" from In re Dant & Russell II without constant reconsideration
whenever new costs are incurred. 1 4 These two procedures would resolve the
amount of the environmental claim in order to better facilitate the Chapter
11 reorganization while still involving the environmental authorities in the
reorganization process. Cost estimation may have its limits, 1 5 but it may
also create a workable solution for balancing the interests of environmental
reclamation and corporate reorganization.
1. Settlement with the EPA
As an initial move to facilitate the claims process in bankruptcy, debtors
and environmental regulators could settle the existing dispute over cleanup
obligations. Debtors who settle early with the EPA benefit from the certainty
of resolution and potential protection from further suits that CERCLA
provides. Settling debtors also move closer to plan confirmation, since the
amount of their environmental claims will be determined quickly.
Section 122 of CERCLA, added by the SARA amendments in 1986,116
authorizes the federal government to settle with PRPs for some or all of
the potential costs of cleanup "[w]henever practicable and in the public
interest.'"7 The EPA, in determining how to proceed with the cleanup,
may prepare a nonbinding preliminary allocation of responsibility (NBAR),
114. 11 U.S.C. § 5020) permits reconsideration for cause, -a prospect that would severely
jeopardize the confirmation of a plan. For a discussion of In re Dant & Russell II, see supra
notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
115. For instance, determining the amount of a claim for response costs may involve
calculations and speculation beyond the typical product liability suit. Furthermore, the EPA
contends that estimation amounts to pre-enforcement judicial review in violation of CERCLA
§ 113(f). CERCLA § 113(0, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0 (1988); see, e.g., United States v. ETV Corp.
(In re Chateaugay Corp.), 944 F.2d 997, 1005-06; In re National Gypsum II, supra note 53.
116. Superfund Amendments and Reauthonzation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, Title
I, § 122(a), 100 Stat. 1678 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675).
117. CERCLA § 122(a).
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which "allocates percentages of the total cost of response among potentially
responsible parties at the facility "I This section even permits the EPA to
bar further contribution claims from settled matters" 9 or grant covenants
not to sue. 2' The purpose behind this carrot-and-stick -approach to resolving
CERCLA liability is the desire for parties to settle quickly, thereby com-
mencing cleanup sooner rather than later.
These settlement procedures apply to cost recovery actions, but Congress
could create an analogous procedure to be undertaken at a preliminary stage
in the cleanup process. The first stage of a cleanup involves the preparation
of an RI/FS to determine the scope of the contamination and the potential
costs of reclamation.' 2' While such a study would be a useful tool for early
stage settlement, a typical RI/ES takes as long as three years to prepare.
Since this period would probably doom most reorganizations of debtors
with environmental liabilities, a new limited RI/FS could be created to
expedite the process.'2 This study would not involve the thorough analysis
found in the current RI/FS but instead would summarize prelimnary
estimates of liability The schedule for completion of the limited RI/FS
would be far shorter (for instance, 90 days) in order to facilitate the
reorgamzation process. The limited RI/FS would no doubt lack the extensive
analysis of the current study, but this expedited procedure would involve
the EPA in the reorganization at an earlier stage and increase the possibility
of facilitating a feasible plan which would provide for the polluter's partic-
ipation in the cleanup.
A limited RI/FS, however, would bring with it the problems of inaccuracy
resulting from the shortened time frame. Response costs, unlike other
corporate claims, are difficult to estimate due to technological inaccuracies,
and the public health and safety would seem to demand an even greater
concern with accuracy in order to restore the environment and protect the
public.
But the delays associated with preparing the studies may actually disserve
the public health more than the potential for inaccuracy. The typical RI/
FS takes years to complete, time which could be spent cleaning up the site.
Undertaking an early cleanup may substantially reduce the end costs of the
118. Id. § 122(e)(3)(A).
119. Id. § 122(h)(4). For broader contribution protection, see also id. § 113(f)(2).
120. Id. § 122(0.
121. The current RI/FS appeared as part of the National Contingency Plan: National Oil
and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 55 Fed. Reg. 8698 (1990) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 300); National Priorities List for Uncontrolled Hazardous Waste, 54
Fed. Reg. 13,296 (1989) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 300); National Priorities List for
Uncontrolled Hazardous Waste, 52 Fed. Reg. 27,622 (1987) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.
300). To establish a limited RI/FS, the EPA would publish guidelines in the Federal Register
narrowing the scope of the study and possibly providing a 90-day schedule for completion.
122. For a discussion of the limited RI/FS, see infra note 123 and accompanying text.
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project while also protecting the public health and safety from the outset.
The snail's pace at which current CERCLA cleanups progress is so time-
consuming and so administratively expensive that the delays only exacerbate
existing problems. For example, under the current procedure, a cleanup
originally estimated at one million dollars may grow to five or ten million
dollars by the time the RI/FS is completed and the cleanup actually begins,
due only to the time delay. For this reason, a quick response action is
preferable to a wait-and-see approach dependent upon the drawn-out RI/
FS process.1 3
CERCLA currently forces companies, which would have a reasonable
chance of reorganization if the cleanup were undertaken early, to liquidate
rather than wait in bankruptcy for the RI/FS. Subjecting reorganizing
debtors to long delays while the CERCLA clock ticks dunng the RI/FS
period severely threatens any chance of reorganization.
Permitting the debtor to settle with the EPA would also serve the goal
of quick response action. For reorganizing debtors, the settlement procedure
could be undertaken as quickly as possible to expedite the reorganization.12 4
The settlement amount would then become a claim in the debtor's reorgan-
ization. 25 Although response costs often result in multimillion dollar liabil-
ities, actual settlements are routinely far less than the Agency's claim,
thereby resulting in a claim that could be potentially reorgamzed.126 The
EPA recognizes the potential damage that CERCLA liabilities may have on
reorganization prospects and on the EPA's own potential for cost recovery.
Thus the agency will often settle with a debtor for an amount that would
not render the plan infeasible. 127 The EPA is also aware of the expense and
123. Such a quick response would not prevent the EPA from including a "reopener" clause
in any consent decree, which permits the EPA to institute new proceedings against the debtor
or the reorganized corporation based on "previously unknown conditions or new information"
concerning the sites. See, e.g., Lodging of Proposed Consent Decree Pursuant to the Com-
prehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 55 Fed. Reg. 46,110
(1990).
124. Debtors should attempt to liquidate liabilities into damages only, for responsive actions
would most likely cause undue delay to the bankruptcy proceeding.
125. For the priority that the proposed claim would receive, see infra notes 144-47 and
accompanying text.
126. For example, the Department of Justice and the Bellamah Community Development
Company settled a two million dollar claim for response costs for $150,000 and an irrevocable
right of access to the site. Lodging of Stipulation and Agreement Pursuant to the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, as Amended ("CERCLA"),
56 Fed. Reg. 65,507 (1991).
127. The EPA noted this consideration in a consent decree with Atlantic Richfield (ARCO)
that stated "consideration and approval of the ARCO decree, with its resulting impact on
ARCO's cross claims against Sharon Steel, will significantly enhance the prospects for confir-
mation of the Sharon Steel Plan of Reorgamzation, pursuant to which Sharon Steel may be
able to emerge from bankruptcy." Lodging of Proposed Consent Decree Pursuant to the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 55 Fed. Reg. 46,110
(1991). The debtor was a PRP as the current owner or operator of the site and was subject
to cross claims from ARCO. The recognition of the impact on Sharon Steel's reorganization
shows the EPA's increasing awareness of bankruptcy problems.
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length of CERCLA litigation, and quick settlements avoid these costs and
delays. This recognition is an important step toward settling CERCLA suits
with reorganizing debtors.12
Facing the possibility that the environmental claim would be classified as
a cost of preserving the estate (an administrative expense) and not a general
unsecured claim, debtors would be wise to reach a consensual settlement
with the environmental authorities. 129 Debtors with ongoing environmental
obligations would have -liability fixed by settlement and would avoid mach-
inations over how much of the contamination occurred post-petition. For
CERCLA section 107 response costs, the EPA would probably receive a
greater amount of the debtor's estate than it would have received under the
current structure. 30 Parties that elect not to settle risk the potential failure
of the reorganization because of the overwhelming contingent claim of the
environmental authorities. By settling with the environmental authorities,
the debtor fixes a claim amount that may permit a feasible plan of
reorganization.13'
There are two principle ways in which the EPA benefits from a settlement
with a reorganizing debtor. First, the settlement permits the EPA to avoid
costly and protracted litigation. Second, and more importantly, by settling
with a reorgaizing debtor, the EPA has a stake in the reorganization and
can vote on proposed reorganization plans. This voting power grants the
Agency some discretion in accepting the plan, for if the settlement amount
seems too small in relation to the claims of other creditors, the EPA can
vote against the plan and encourage the debtor to negotiate further. 32 The
stake in the reorganization process allows the EPA to maintain some measure
of influence over the debtor which may include direction in the cleanup
itself.
2. Estimation under the Code
If the debtor is unable or unwilling to settle with the EPA, the bankruptcy
court could estimate the amount of the allowable environmental claim.
128. The bankruptcy court also becomes involved if the debtor decides to settle with the
EPA while the bankruptcy case is pending. A debtor must obtain court approval to settle with
a class of creditors (and presumably the environmental authorities would be their own class
in the reorganization). FED. R. B~ANR. P 9019(a)-(b). This approval should be immediately
granted so long as the settlement would not destroy the feasibility of the plan.
129. For a discussion of administrative expense or general unsecured priority, see supra
notes 57-70 and accompanying text.
130. CERCLA § 107(c), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c) (1988). The same does not hold true for
CERCLA § 106 abatement actions, under which the EPA probably would receive administrative
expense priority. CERCLA § 106(b). See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
131. If the settlement amount still renders the plan infeasible, the debtor should reassess
the possibility of any reorganization.
132. 11 U.S.C. § 1126 (1988).
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While settlement has typically been recognized as the preferable approach
to resolving disputes with the EPA, the agency may be unwilling to settle
on terms that would permit plan confirmation.'33 Bankruptcy should there-
fore provide a mechanism for handling these unsettled claims for reorgan-
izing debtors.
The bankruptcy court has the discretion to estimate claims for allowance
under section 502(c), including contingent or unliquidated claims or other
rights to payment. 134 Many courts have exercised wide discretion in applying
this section, using it as a requisite crutch toward reorganization.1 35
The estimation procedure could be readily applied to environmental
claims.' 36 The bankruptcy court would use the limited RIIFS to determine
the total cost of cleanup and the allocation of the debtor's share of the
cleanup from an NBAR to estimate the debtor's total potential future
liability. Based on the limited RI/FS and the NBAR, the court could
estimate the EPA's contingent future claim against the debtor for unsettled
cleanup costs and include the estimated claim in the reorganization plan. 37
Estimation can be as useful for environmental claims as it is for other
unliquidated claims or payment rights. Since the liquidation of environmen-
tal claims could otherwise "unduly delay the administration of the case,' ' x3
the bankruptcy court should be encouraged to estimate such claims for
allowance in the bankruptcy proceeding.
Greater urgency for estimation is provided by In re Dant & Russell II,139
in which the Ninth Circuit held that a party may recover incurred costs but
not projected future cleanup costs from a reorganizing debtor under
CERCLA.' 40 The court focused on which costs were actually incurred at
the time of the bankruptcy filing instead of costs that would flow from the
releases. Besides further complicating the definition of "claim" and when
133. Although settlements establish a working relationship with the EPA and may permit
cost scheduling, onerous terms may doom an entire reorganization. For instance, absent a
broad covenant not to sue for future unanticipated costs, debtors would still face future
liability for environmental damages after settlement (and often the EPA is loath to grant broad
covenants not to sue due to the lughly speculative nature of cleanup costs). For a discussion
of when to settle, see Stephen L. Kass & Michael B. Gerard, CERCLA Settlements with the
EPA, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 24, 1992, at 3.
134. II U.S.C. § 502(c).
135. For example, m Menard-Sanford v. Mabey (In re A.H. Robins, Inc.), 880 F.2d 694
(4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied 493 U.S. 959 (1989), after considering widely diffenng estimates
from interested parties, the Fourth Circuit accepted the bankruptcy court's estimation of A.H.
Robins' liability resulting from the Dalkon Shield claims.
136. One court has already taken this step, estimating both response costs and natural
resource damages to allow for reorganization. In re National Gypsum II, supra note 53.
137. See infra notes 144-56 and accompanying text for a discussion of the priority this claim
would receive in the reorganization.
138. 11 U.S.C. § 502(c).
139. 951 F.2d 246 (9th Cir. 1991).
140. Id. at 250.
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it arises, 4 the court created an opportunity for ongoing recoveries from
the debtor as cleanup costs are incurred. Such a "temporary disallowance"
is not unique to environmental claims, 142 but it is potentially crippling to
any future reorganization. Providing a mechanism to consistently assess new
damages against a reorganized debtor for pre-petition releases jeopardizes
future reorganizations.
A workable resolution to .In re Dant & Russell II would have been to
estimate future costs to be incurred by the debtor, Burlington Northern,
for cleanup of the site. Estimation of future liability would provide the
debtor with the opportunity to consider all claims arising from pre-petition
acts in its reorganization, a critical element of bankruptcy policy. The
resulting allowance would constitute the environmental claim for consider-
ation in the reorganization.' 4
Claim estimation serves both the debtor and the environmental agencies.
For the debtor, estimation of the environmental claim guides later reorgan-
ization plans by fixing an amount of the claim owed to the environmental
authorities. For the environmental authorities, estimation of liability supplies
the agency with a financial stake and a vote in the potential reorganization,
assuring it of some payment in the future. Estimation serves the policies of
notice to other parties and avoidance of "sudden death" for otherwise
viable businesses. What this procedure lacks in exactness it makes up in
timeliness: reorganizing debtors may be able to reorganize the estimated
amount and environmental authorities will recover an amount toward cleanup
upon confirmation of the plan. The next step is determining what status
the environmental claim should receive in the reorganization.
C. Governmental Unit Priority for Environmental Claims
The Code provides that "allowed unsecured claims of governmental units"
receive a special priority for distribution.'" Satisfaction of these claims may
be extended for up to six years after the date of assessment of such a
claim.' 45 Since assessment is the important date, debtors must determine
exactly when the tax, duty, or similar claim was assessed to determine the
141. For a discussion of the effect of this case on claims in reorganizations, see supra notes
66-69 and accompanying text.
142. See also Bittner v. Borne Chem. Co., 691 F.2d 134 (3d Cir. 1982).
143. A recent case may establish the availability of such a solution. In the National Gypsum
bankruptcy proceedings, supra note 53, a court has determined that the amount of the EPA's
claim for response costs and natural resource damages could be estimated consistently with
both CERCLA and the Bankruptcy Code.
144. See i1 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7) (1988). Tis section also includes claims by individuals,
placing them ahead of the government, which can more easily bear losses resulting from
bankruptcy. See also Claar, supra note 14, at 55.
145. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(C).
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maximum extension period. The Code also requires the debtor to pay the
present value of the obligation in order to use the extended payment period.
By providing debtors with the option to extend or stretch out payment
for these priority claims over a six year period, the Code creates a mechanism
to encourage reorganization plans. If these priority claims had to be paid
in full immediately following confirmation, many plans would fail the
confirmation requirement of feasibility. 46 Instead, the Code delineates these
priority claims from admimstrative expenses, permitting deferred cash pay-
ments equal to the value of the claim. 47
A similar extension period is critical for satisfaction of environmental
claims. Stretching out the period for payment lifts debtors out from under
the imnediate crippling pressure of environmental obligations while still
providing environmental regulators with a guarantee of repayment over
time. The time of assessment, which starts the six year payment clock,
should be the time at which the authority cited the debtor for the environ-
mental violation.
A vexing problem for courts approaching tax claims that would also
affect environmental claims is the appropriate interest rate to use for the
extension period. The Code indicates that the relevant standard for confir-
mation is the current value of deferred cash payments. 14 The rate must be
"reasonable in light of the risks involved" and should include consideration
of the security itself and the risk of default. 49 Courts have struggled to
determine an applicable standard, applying the market rate, 50 the Treasury
bill rate,"5 or the rate assessed by the Internal Revenue Service for delinquent
taxes. 52 The determination of which rate to apply is within the court's
discretion.
In setting the interest rate for environmental claims, the court must also
consider two major factors: risk of default and available collateral. The
risks of default, while also a problem for tax claims, may be far higher
146. Id. § 1129(a)(11).
147. II U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(C) provides that:
with respect to a claim of a kind specified in section 507(a)(7) of this title, the
holder of such caiam will receive on account of such claim deferred cash payments,
over a period not exceeding six years after the date of assessment of such claim,
of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, equal to the allowed amount of
such claim.
Id. § 1129(a)(9)(C). Admimstrative expenses enjoy no such deferral mechanism. Id. §
1129(a)(9)(A).
148. Id. (emphasis added).
149. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Monmer (In re Monimer Bros.), 755 F.2d 1336, 1339
(8th Cir. 1985) (citation omitted).
150. In re Southern States Motor Inns, Inc., 709 F.2d 647, 653 (lth Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1022 (1984).
151. In re Connecticut Aerosols, Inc., 42 B.R. 706 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1984).
152. Architectural Design, Inc. v. IRS (In re Architectural Design, Inc.), 59 Bankr. 1019,
1022 (W.D. Va. 1986) (citing 26 U.S.C. § 6621 as establishing proper interest rate).
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with a large environmental claim. Therefore, the interest rate must include
this risk. The other factor is the lack of collateral to secure the environmental
claim. Secured claims may bear a relatively low rate of interest because of
the option of foreclosure. But this option is unavailable for an environmental
claim. CERCLA already creates a lien on contaminated property. Another
environmental lien would have little effect. Although bankruptcy courts
have not settled the interest rate question for tax claims, the options utilized
provide appropriate parameters for applying an interest rate to environmen-
tal claims.
Creating a deferred payment plan for environmental obligations requires
amending the Code to recognize these new priority claims. Cleanup obli-
gations should be added to section 507(a)(7)'s litany of allowed unsecured
claims of governmental units.'53 "Governmental unit," as defined in the
Code, covers all types of federal and state governmental authorities, a term
presumably broad enough to include state and federal environmental regu-
latory bodies. 54 While section 507(a)(7) currently refers only to taxes,
customs duties, and penalties, the provision could tolerate an amendment
to include environmental authorities. 55
Amending section 507(a)(7) to include cleanup obligations would provide
a mechamsm for consistently handling the recurrent problem of how to
treat environmental orders in bankruptcy. 56 The new section would provide
notice to parties, reduce the number of "sudden death" results due to
environmental claims, and create equal treatment for another governmental
unit.
D. Preserving Adequate Protection
The interests of debtors and environmental authorities would be better
served by predictable treatment of environmental claims than by the current
inconsistencies. Creditors must also enjoy increased protection over their
security in the face of increasing environmental demands. Although envi-
ronmental claims may be conveniently funded by using estate property for
cleanup, 57 use of estate property without adequate protection violates bank-
ruptcy's equality procedures that protect creditors. The Code requires that
property may be used only on condition of adequate protection to the
153. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7) (1988); see infra Appendix B.
154. 11 U.S.C. § 101(26).
155. Another commentator makes a persuasive argument that cleanup claims should receive
ugher priority because "[c]leanup liabilities supply funds to only one government program
while taxes supply funds to most of the others." Claar, supra note 14, at 55.
156. For the proposed amendment to 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7), see infra Appendix B.
157. See In re Environmental Waste Control, 125 B.R. 546 (N.D. Ind. 1991).
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secured creditor.""8 Amending the Code would be unnecessary to solve this
problem, especially in light of governmental unit priority for environmental
authorities,'5 9 but the Bankruptcy Rules should be amended to protect
creditors in the environmental claims process.
Debtors receive protection from creditors with the automatic stay and the
use of encumbered property while in bankruptcy; creditors are protected by
the concept of "adequate protection," a term defined in the Code only by
example. Adequate protection is a fundamental requirement of bankruptcy's
collective process, for it does not allow debtors to abrogate the rights of
creditors by filing the petition.
The court in In re Environmental Waste Control60 came dangerously
close to ignoring the right to adequate protection entirely. The court stated
that adequate protection was not a matter for its consideration, 6' .yet it
permitted the use of estate property for cleanup in the meantime.'6 The
decision is more problematic in light of the security at issue, cash collateral,
which may only be used with creditor consent or court authorization.' 6"
Since the district court refused to reach the issue of adequate protection,
leaving it to the bankruptcy court on remand, the bankruptcy court must
find a way for the debtor to supply periodic cash payments, an additional
or replacement lien, or other such relief constituting an "indubitable equiv-
alent" for adequate protection.' 64 Some commentators posit that the cash
collateral should not be used without consent "absent very special circum-
stances."' 65 This concern is justified since the secured creditor will be
enjoying no direct benefit based on the use of her cash collateral. While
environmental harms are compelling, forcing a secured creditor to bear
massive cleanup costs is manifestly unjust and removes adequate protection
of the creditor's security.
The specific facts of In re Environmental Waste Control may seem
compelling for preferring environmental policy over bankruptcy. 166 The court
recognized that the secured creditor's claim of priority would have been
stronger absent the "imminent danger" to the environment under the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act order'67 and absent the "circum-
stances of this case," which may be a passing reference to the secured
creditor's involvement with the debtor.'"
158. I1 U.S.C. § 363(e).
159. See infra Appendix B.
160. 125 B.R. 546.
161. Id. at 552.
162. Id. at 546.
163. II U.S.C. § 363(c)(2) (1988); see also FED. R. BANct. P 4001.
164. I1 U.S.C. § 361.
165. Mirsky et al., supra note 12, at 667.
166. See supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text.
167. In re Environmental Waste Control, 125 B.R. at 552.
168. Id. at 550. Supporters to Oppose Pollution (STOP) argued that the secured creditor
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But should imminent danger resulting from actions of the debtor force a
secured creditor to act as an environmental insurer? "Imminent danger"
may justify elevation to administrative expense priority, as in most "im-
minent and identifiable threat" situations under CERCLA section 106,169
but that standard should not create a new priority above secured status.
Unless the creditor herself has acted in violation of environmental laws, her
exposure should not be so extreme. The site will be cleaned up;170 the real
issue is simply who shoulders the cost.' 7 ' While forcing a deep-pocket lender
to pay the cost of a cleanup may be attractive as a matter of policy, neither
the environmental statutes nor any other legislation mandates such cost
spreading. Absent involvement at the site by the secured creditor,'7 the
secured creditor's position should be neither bolstered nor weakened by the
existence of an imminent danger or other acts of the debtor.
Adjusting the positions of secured creditors based on imminent dangers
or other potential harms undermines the position of federal bankruptcy law
by removing adequate protection when an attractive environmental policy
presents itself. Broad extensions of environmental policy pollute the bank-
ruptcy process and lead to uncertainty for lenders in an already uncertain
business climate. 73 Lenders will be forced to condition loans to businesses-
not just landfills, but all businesses-on satisfaction of costly environmental
assessments and agreements for future monitoring. 7 4 This requirement alone
was itself a PRP at the site. If this were proven (and the court did not mention this), the
secured creditor's argument would indeed pale in comparison.
169. See, e.g., United States v. LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 944 F.2d 997, 1004
(2d Cir. 1991); In re National'Gypsum II, supra note 53.
170. The EPA has the option to compel a responsible party to clean up the property or to
perform the cleanup itself and impose costs. Under either situation, the site will be restored.
It may be relevant to note, however, that in bankruptcy innocent taxpayers may bear at least
a portion of the cost allocated to the debtor.
171. "[Ihe ultimate issue in cases such as this is not whether contamination should be
cleaned up, but who must pay for it. By attempting to compel bankruptcy estates to clean up
contamination, as opposed to having the state do so the [New Jersey Department of Environ-
mental Protection] is at least as concerned with the public fisc as with the public health."
Torwico Electronics, Inc. v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection (In re Torwico Electronics,
Inc.), 131 B.R. 561, 577 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1991) (quoting Midiantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey
Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 507 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)). "The DEP
admits as much: 'Public money is scarce; necessary cleanups abound."' Id. (quoting Brief of
DEP filed March 8, 1991, at 32).
172. For the regulation providing the level of involvement for liability, see 57 Fed. Reg.
18,344 (1992).
173. This is not to say that the evolving doctrine of lender liability for environmental claims
is rmsplaced. Quite the contrary, lenders who act as owners or operators are already subject
to liability under the federal environmental statutes. See In re Bergsoe Metal Corp., 910 F.2d
668 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding the lender not liable unless it actually exercised the right of
control); but see United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1557 (l1th Cir. 1990)
(holding the lender liable simply by having the "capacity to influence the corporation's
treatment of hazardous wastes"), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 752 (1991).
174. These steps may be the effect of New Jersey's ECRA, which provides other measures
to ensure financial security for cleanup obligations. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:lK-6 to -12
(West 1991).
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would drive up the costs of borrowing for businesses and individuals alike. 175
Courts must adhere to the mandate of adequate protection to comply
with due process requirements nposed by the takings clause of the Fifth
Amendment, which protects creditors from destruction of their security. 7 6
As security interests are property, "a secured creditor has a constitutional
right to preserve the value of its secured claim on the petition date."' 77 The
court in In re Heldor stated that use of a secured creditor's collateral
violated the Fifth Amendment, holding that "[t]he only expenses which can
be charged against a creditor's collateral are those for preserving or disposing
of the collateral" under section 506(c). 17s As environmental cleanup costs
only preserve the value of real property, the use of cash collateral for
cleanups without consent violates the Fifth Amendment.
The judicial appioach to adequate protection should utilize the Heldor
court's strict reading of the Code. That decision protects the rights of the
secured creditor in her cash collateral and requires that the "estate com-
pensate a secured creditor for any decrease in the value of its collateral
resulting from the bankruptcy case."' 79 Adequate protection must be pro-
vided to secured creditors, notwithstanding judicial exuberance to environ-
mental policies.
Encouraging adherence to a single bankruptcy court is insufficient, since
the appropriate means of directing courts is through amendment to the
Code or Rules. For CERCLA claims, an amendment to the Rules to provide
for a specific authonzation requirement will protect creditors who have the
misfortune to lend to polluters.1'
CONCLUSION
Bankruptcy policy is suffering at the hands of compelling environmental
policies. Congress, increasingly attuned to hazardous waste problems, has
forced businesses to shoulder more of the burden for cleamng up the
environment. But courts are gutting bankruptcy's most important provisions
175. The chief economist for the American Association of Bankers already claims that
lender liability is part of the cause of the current credit crunch. Environmental Liability
Contributing to Credit Crunch, Banking Official Says, Bankr. L. Daily (BNA) at 4 (Oct. 29,
1991).
176. See United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70 (1982).
177. In re Heldor Industries, 131 B.R. 578, 586 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1991) (quoting Wright v.
Umon Central Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 273, 278 (1940)).
178. Id. at 586. The In re Environmental Waste Control court gave little notice to this
constitutional challenge by the secured creditor, dismissing the argument as inextricably
intertwined with the adequate protection claim that it had remanded. In re Environmental
Waste Control, 125 B.R. 546, 552 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1991).
179. In re Heldor, 131 B.R. at 586.
180. For the specific amendment to reinforce the primacy of adequate protection, see infra
Appendix C.
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by preferring vague environmental policies at the expense of secured lenders.
The solution to environmental problems in reorganizations lies not in
creating involuntary insurers for polluting debtors but in refining the Bank-
ruptcy Code and Rules to cope with shifting American concerns and
establishing a predictable process for resolving thorny environmental issues
in bankruptcy.
Bankruptcy attempts to avoid inconsistency by providing debtors with an
opportunity to reorganize and creditors with a uniform, predictable system
of equal distribution of available assets. Courts that meddle with the Code
to further competing policies disserve the debtor/creditor relationship and
usurp the job of Congress to enact federal statutes. If Congress wishes to
prefer environmental policies at the expense of bankruptcy or other laws,
it may enact legislation to do so. Courts, however, enjoy no such legislative
power. Their role is to interpret the laws, including the Code and Rules,
and respect the compromises made by Congress. By upsetting these com-
promises, they create inconsistent results, force reorganizing debtors into
"sudden death," and prefer environmental authorities over other govern-
mental entities, results which are detnmental to the working of the bank-
ruptcy process.
Congress should amend the Code and Rules to create a unique process
for environmental claims for response costs. By establishing a process for
determining the amount of the claim, granting governmental unit priority
to environmental authorities, and preserving adequate protection, Congress
will serve the policies of both bankruptcy and environmental law.
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APPENDIX A
Proposed amendments to 11 U.S.C. § 502(c) and Bankruptcy Rule
3003(c) to create a method for determining the amount of
environmental claims
Section 502(c) of the Bankruptcy Code provides the court with the broad
discretion to estimate contingent or unliquidated claims to avoid undue
delay in the admimstration of the bankruptcy case.1'8 In order to direct
courts to consider the necessity of estimating environmental claims in the
bankruptcy process, the section should be amended to provide for environ-
mental estimations.
Instead of attempting to locate response costs within the existing frame-
work of this provision, a new subsection should be appended to the
estimation provision for environmental claims. New section 502(c)(3) would
read as follows:
(c) There shall be estimated for purpose of allowance under this section-
.. (3) any response costs under 42 U.S.C. § 9607 [CERCLA], or any
similar federal or state environmental provision.
To provide further procedural guidance in the claim filing process, the
Bankruptcy Rules would be amended to require the environmental agencies
to file a proof of claim for consideration in the estimation process. Such a
requirement would simplify the estimation process, for the environmental
authorities would be forced to file their own approximations of the cleanup
costs. New Rule 3003(c) would read as follows:
(c) FiLNG PROOF OF CLAIM.
... (2) Who Must File. Any creditor or equity security holder whose
claim or interest is not scheduled, scheduled as disputed, contingent, or
unliquidated, or scheduled as a right to payment by the environmental
authorities for response costs shall file a proof of claim..
This amendment to Rule 3003(c) would expedite the claims process and
serve the interests of both the debtor and the environmental agency by
requiring an estimate of the costs of cleanup. Only by requiring a proof of
claim to be filed by the agency can the court hope to make a sound
estimation.
181. 11 U.S.C. § 502(c) (1988).
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APPENDIX B
Proposed amendment to 11 U.S.C. § 507 providing priority status
to environmental claims
This section establishes that certain claims are entitled to priority status.
Congress determined that these special claims should be treated before all
other unsecured claims in order to facilitate the reorganization process.
Section 507(a)(7) applies specifically to "allowed unsecured claims of
governmental units,"'182 and includes taxes or customs duties and accom-
panying penalties. The Code defines "governmental unit" broadly so as not
to include only taxing and customs authorities.' 83 Governmental units typi-
cally hold claims with no listed security, such as a tax claim or a customs
duty Since the definition has such breadth, environmental authorities fall
within "governmental unit" for bankruptcy purposes. Furthermore, envi-
ronmental claims for response costs should fall within this section as priority
claims.
Amending section 507(a)(7) requires only an additional section with no
change to the introduction. This new section would become a part of
existing section 507(a)(7) since Congress, to remain consistent, should treat
environmental obligations on a par with other claims of governmental
units.18 This new section would precede current section 507(a)(7)(G), which
provides priority for penalties related to these claims (section 507(a)(7)(G)
would then become section 507(a)(7)(H)). The penalty would apply with
equal force to environmental violations and therefore should remain the
final provision within the section.
New section 507(a)(7)(G) would read as follows:
(a) The following expenses and claims have priority in the following
order: (7) Seventh, allowed unsecured claims of governmental units,
only to the extent that such claims are for-
. (G) response costs under 42 U.S.C. § 9607 [CERCLAI, or any
similar federal or state environmental provision, including-(i) any amount of settlement between the debtor and the EPA or the
state equivalent, or
(ii) an estimation under 502(c)(3) of this title for environmental response
costs.
182. Id. § 507(a)(7).
183. Id. § 101(26).
184. Another commentator argues that environmental obligations should receive a higher
priority than the tax claims within § 507(a)(7). Claar, supra note 14, at 55. Consistency will
be better served by merely including environmental claims within the existing framework of §
507(a)(7), which is intended to apply to governmental units generally, such as the Internal
Revenue Service and the U.S. Customs Service.
[Vol. 68:233
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPEDIMENTS
This amendment would include claims by the EPA and state departments
of environmental management against the reorganizing debtor. The provision
would allow debtors to reorganize with consideration of all pre-petition
environmental claims, avoiding "sudden death" for the debtor while treating
governmental units consistently. Other provisions throughout the Code that
reference section 507(a)(7), such as section 1129(a)(9)(C), would remain
unaffected textually by the change, but these provisions would apply with
equal force to environmental obligations.
APPENDIX C
Proposed amendment to Bankruptcy Rule 4001 to preserve
adequate protection for secured creditors
By amending Rule 4001, Congress would protect creditors from having
their collateral depleted to finance environmental reclamation projects. An
amendment would specifically condition the use of estate property on court
authorization and provision of adequate protection. Interposing the judicial
process before applying estate property for an environmental reclamation
would guide the parties and protect creditors in the environmental claims
process.
New Rule 4001(e) would read as follows:
(e) ADEQUATE IaoTmcnoN. The court shall authorize the use of any
estate property for environmental reclamation only upon the provision
of adequate protection to the secured party.
This amendment merely states in the environmental context what is
observed in other situations: that adequate protection is a constitutionally
mandated requirement in bankruptcy. The amendment would recognize the
unique nature of environmental claims and would provide explicit guidance
in a difficult process
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